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REVISING ARTICLE 9 TO REDUCE
WASTEFUL LITIGATION
JamesJ. White*
I. INTRODUCTION
For reasons that are unclear to me, the committees reviewing the
articles of the Uniform Commercial Code and drafting revisions are con-
genitally conservative. Perhaps these committees take their charge too
seriously, namely, to revise, not to revolutionize. Perhaps their intimate
knowledge of the subject matter exaggerates the importance of each sec-
tion and consequently magnifies the apparent size of every change. In
any case, my own experience with two such committees tells me that the
members quickly become focused on revisions and amendments that any
outsider would describe as modest. To the extent that the revision of any
of the articles of the UCC is going to be more than modest, the push
must come from academics or practicing commercial lawyers outside of
these committees. In this Essay I accept my own offer to propose a mod-
ification in Article 9 that most commercial lawyers will think is more
than modest. For myself, I claim only that it might be at the upper
bound of modest change; viewed from a distance, it certainly is not
revolutionary.
II. THE PROPOSAL AND ITS LEGAL EFFECT
I propose that the drafters of Article 9 repeal section 9-301(1). That
subsection provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of ... (b) a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is per-
fected .... '
To one unfamiliar with Article 9 of the UCC, the consequences of
such revision will not be obvious. To begin to understand those conse-
quences, consider the first sentence of section 9-201:
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank
Robert Fogler, my research assistant, who performed the Augean task of digging through 888
cases in which trustees in bankruptcy challenged a creditor's security interest.
1. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1990).
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Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement
is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.2
Section 9-201 makes even an unperfected security interest king of the hill
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act."3 Unless some other rule
contained in Article 9 deposes an unperfected security interest, it is
king.' Section 9-301(1)(b) does subordinate unperfected security inter-
ests to the rights of lien creditors. If that subsection were removed, the
priority would be reversed and an unperfected security interest would be
superior to a lien creditor's claim.
The direct and most obvious effect of the repeal of section 9-
301(1)(b) would be to subordinate a creditor who had procured a judicial
lien-usually after judgment and levy-to an unperfected secured credi-
tor who had a security interest in the personal property on which the lien
creditor levied.' Because creditors with judicial liens on personal prop-
erty6 are more scarce than wise men in President Clinton's Cabinet, this
consequence would be unimportant.' I predict that subordination of the
judicial lien creditor's claim to an unperfected secured creditor's claim in
2. Id. § 9-201.
3. Id.
4. As Professor Carlson has pointed out, to describe the secured creditor as king is an
overstatement. See David G. Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 547
(1984). In fact, the creditor is subject not only to contrary rules in Article 9 but also to rules of
the common law, such as those dealing with fraudulent conveyances and others that are
brought to Article 9 via § 1-103. See id. at 563-64. Of course, a mere reference to § 1-103 does
not provide a coherent answer because widespread introduction of common-law ideas would
completely diminish the force of the clause in § 9-201. See id.
5. Perhaps the law could be written so that any secured creditor who failed to make a
claim known within a reasonable period after a competing lien arose could not later assert it.
The application of § 9-301(l)(c) would have that effect, at least with respect to buyers at any
sale on lien creditor's foreclosure. Although buyers at such a sale would not be ordinary
course buyers, they would be protected by § 9-301(l)(c) against the claims of any unperfected
secured creditor.
6. This includes all such liens except garnishment and attachment liens on wages and
bank accounts.
7. A LEXIS search of all reported federal and state cases in 1991 and 1992 yielded only
five cases involving an Article 9 dispute between an unperfected secured creditor and a judg-
ment lien creditor: In re Rader, 144 B.R. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Wickson v. Burruano,
No. 51-11-16, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1801 (1991); Crossroads Bank v. Corim, Inc., 418
S.E.2d 601 (Ga.), vacated, 422 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. App. 1992); Front Row Seating, Inc. v. New
England Concerts, Ltd., 602 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); National City Bank v.
Golden Acre Turkeys, Inc., 604 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio 1992).
The LEXIS search that was used ("DATE AFT 1990 and UNPERFECTI w/90 LIEN
w/10 CREDITOR!") produced 78 cases. Of the 13 cases involving a dispute between a non-
trustee lien creditor and an unperfected secured creditor, nine involved government IRS liens
and drug or burglary forfeiture liens.
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Article 9 and outside of bankruptcy would go almost unnoticed by law-
yers and courts.
Because trustees in bankruptcy are as ubiquitous as judicial lienors
are scarce, the principal effect of the repeal of section 9-301(l)(b) would
be in bankruptcy. As every commercial lawyer knows, § 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code8 makes the trustee in bankruptcy a hypothetical lien
creditor on the date the petition is filed. From that date the trustee in
bankruptcy has the rights that a hypothetical lien creditor would have
under state law. Indirectly, the combination of § 544(a) and section 9-
301(l)(b) elevates not only the trustee in bankruptcy-our hypothetical
lien creditor-but also his or her flock of unsecured creditors of the
bankrupt debtor over unperfected secured creditors. Because the trustee
in bankruptcy uses § 544(a) to strike down the unperfected security in-
terest, the unsecured creditors who have claims against the bankruptcy
estate are enriched. This is because the collateral that is released from
the avoided security interest is treated merely as an asset of the estate
and, thus, subject to all of the claims of the unsecured creditors.
Section 544(a)(1) rides on state law; it gives the federally created
trustee in bankruptcy only the rights that a lien creditor has under state
law.9 Therefore, a repeal of section 9-301(l)(b), that subordinates the
lien creditor to the unperfected secured creditor in state law, also subor-
dinates the trustee in bankruptcy. Nothing in § 544(a) or in any other
section of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee in bankruptcy an in-
dependent right under federal law to strike down an unperfected security
interest. 10
Before one considers the arguments for and against my proposal,
understand how limited its effect is.. Mostly it will impose the same pri-
ority on unsecured creditors in bankruptcy that would apply to them
8. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
9. See id. § 544(a)(1).
10. Under current law the trustee in bankruptcy could use 11 U.S.C. § 547, to attack a
security interest that had not been perfected at the time the bankruptcy was filed. The change
that I propose in § 9-301 would remove that right because the definition of the "time of trans-
fer" and of "perfection" in itself depends on state law. With the removal of § 9-301(l)(b),
§ 547(e) would make an unfiled security interest-now defined as unperfected-into a per-
fected security interest under § 547(e)(1)(B). This is because after it attached, no "creditor on
a simple contract" could acquire a judicial lien that would be superior to the interest of the
secured creditor. Therefore, "perfection" for bankruptcy purposes would occur at the same
time as attachment. Accordingly, § 547(e)(2)(A) would treat the transfer as made at the time
such transfer takes effect between the transferor and transferee. All this would mean that the
transfer would be outside the 90-day preference period if the security interest attached more
than 90 days prior to the petition; if within the 90-day period, the transfer would still not be
preferential if value were given by the secured creditor simultaneously with the attachment of
the security interest.
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outside bankruptcy. Section 9-201 now grants priority to unperfected
secured creditors over unsecured creditors unless the former procure a
lien. Only a minuscule part of all unsecured creditors in and out of bank-
ruptcy ever procure judicial liens. Therefore, my proposal would merely
put these unsecured creditors in bankruptcy in the same status that they
would suffer outside of bankruptcy, namely, a status subordinate to the
unperfected secured creditors.
Note, too, that many creditors under the current version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code achieve perfection and the attendant priority
without filing, taking possession of the collateral or performing any othei"
public act. For example, a secured purchase money seller of consumer
goods has an automatically perfected security interest superior not only
to unsecured creditors, but also to subsequently secured creditors and to
lien creditors. Section 9-302(1) gives a series of less important examples
of creditors who achieve priority over others simply by executing a secur-
ity agreement with the debtor. Therefore, superiority of one who has
done no public perfecting act is not unknown to Article 9, nor has such
priority caused any obvious difficulties for the credit market.
Understand what the repeal of section 9-301(1)(b) would not do. It
would not give an unperfected secured creditor priority over a perfected
secured creditor under section 9-312. Thus, if secured creditors wished
to have protection against other secured creditors, they would still have
to perfect their security interest, usually by a filing. For that reason,
many secured creditors would file financing statements even under the
regime I propose.
The basic argument for my proposal is straightforward-to elimi-
nate waste. This waste is the cost of unnecessary filings and needless
litigation over the efficacy of secured creditors' perfection. I also argue
that fairness supports my proposal; on that question I would expect rea-
sonable people to differ. Consider the arguments.
III. FAIRNESS 11
Does fairness dictate that unperfected secured creditors be
subordinated to lien creditors? To subsequent unsecured creditors?
Although the section that I would repeal, section 9-301(l)(b), nominally
subordinates unperfected secured creditors to lien creditors, its real im-
pact in the law as practiced in today's bankruptcy and commercial courts
11. The following argument owes much to similar arguments made by Professor John
McCoid. See John C. McCoid II, Bankruptcy, the Avoiding Powers, and Unperfected Security
Interests, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175 (1985). In his article, Professor McCoid also examines the
history of the bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers. Id. at 189-90.
[V/ol. 26:823
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is to subordinate the unperfected secured creditors to unsecured creditors
who have no lien. The perverse effect of the combination of § 544(a) and
section 9-301(1)(b) is a reversal of the priority in bankruptcy between an
unperfected secured creditor and an unsecured creditor that would pre-
vail under section 9-201 outside of bankruptcy. Therefore, in evaluating
the fairness of my proposal, I argue that one should view the competitors
as an unperfected secured creditor on one side, and an unsecured creditor
without a lien on the other. To suggest that the true competitor is a lien
creditor is to ignore today's reality in which judicial liens are few and
bankruptcies are many.
If one so views the competition (i.e., between an unperfected secured
creditor and an unsecured creditor without a lien), it is easy to argue that
the secured creditor should have priority. The secured creditor has at
least taken a security interest; by hypothesis the unsecured creditor has
not. Although some state laws formerly elevated subsequent unperfected
unsecured creditors over unperfected security interests, those laws
changed with the adoption of section 9-201. The very adoption of section
9-201 is a judgment by the drafters of Article 9 and by the legislatures of
all fifty states that it is right and proper that an unperfected security
interest should have superiority over an unsecured creditor's claim. The
adoption of section 9-201 reversed the contrary laws of several states.
1 2
Fundamentally, section 9-201 rests upon the empirical judgment
that few if any general creditors rely on the fling records when they lend.
Neither the plumber, carpenter, accountant, Commonwealth Edison nor
any other thousands of general creditors check the fies to determine who
has a financing statement on file before it decides whether it will extend
unsecured credit in the form of the sale of goods or services. In the
words of the trade, these are "non-reliance creditors" and are not entitled
to protection of a lack of filing because they would not rely on it in any
case.
It is exactly these people-the dross of Article 9 subordinated by
section 9-201-whom the trustee transforms into the precious persons
entitled to section 9-301(1)(b)'s priority even though none of them has
ever procured a lien. One might respond that some of these creditors
could and would themselves have procured judicial liens-and so the
benefits of section 9-301()(b)-had the same result not been available by
pushing the debtor into bankruptcy. That is a fair claim, but I wonder
how much it proves. Being an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy in
12. See, e.g., CAL. COMM. CODE § 9201 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-
201 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.201 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
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which the trustee or the debtor-in-possession is treated as a secured cred-
itor is not the same as being a lien creditor in one's own right. A person
who becomes a lien creditor obtains a property right in the particular
asset to which the lien attaches. In bankruptcy, on the other hand, one
simply shares along with many other pigs at the trough. In that sense,
putting a debtor into bankruptcy and enjoying the benefits of § 544(a) is
not the same as enjoying the benefits of a lien under state law. That is at
least one reason why unsecured creditors should not think of bankruptcy
for their debtors as an alternative to their own lien.
Nevertheless, I concede that some unsecured creditors would have a
greater incentive to procure a judicial lien in a regime where bankruptcy
was infrequent or the trustee enjoyed no lien creditor rights than in the
current regime. For the reasons given above, I believe the number of
unsecured creditors that would procure a judicial lien in the former but
not the latter regime is quite small.
If one ignores bankruptcy and focuses on state law competition be-
tween unperfected secured creditors and lien creditors, what is fair?
Some potential lien creditors might act or fail to act in reliance upon the
state of the filing record. For example, a prospective lien creditor might
levy on a particular asset and fail to levy on another because the UCC
filings appear to show that there is no security interest on either and
because the first was more valuable or easily liquidated than the second.
If a secured creditor has an undisclosed but superior security interest in
the first asset, the lien creditor might be injured, at least to the extent of
the cost of the levy. If the second asset were sold to a bona fide pur-
chaser or subjected to a superior claim by the time our creditor turns to
it, the creditor's loss would be greater. Conceivably, too, the potential
lien creditor could rest upon existing rights and not pursue lien rights
upon default if the record were devoid of filing and he or she was so
lulled into the belief that there were many assets available. Of course,
once it became known that unfiled security interests were superior to ju-
dicial liens, neither of these forms of reliance would be reasonable.
In an elaborate article dealing with lien creditors' claims on real
property, Professor Schechter has argued that unfiled claims should be
subordinate to lien creditors' claims. I I Part of his argument is based on
13. Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real
Property. Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 105 (1988). Under the real property priority rules of many states, including New York,
California and Ohio, unrecorded transfers of real estate to bona fide purchasers have priority
over subsequent lien creditors even though they are subordinate to the rights of subsequent
purchasers. In effect, the recording laws of these states treat lien creditors as non-reliance
parties and do not protect them. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993);
[Vol. 26:823
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cases that illustrate the reliance of potential lien creditors.14 Ignoring for
the moment the differences between personal property and real property
and the differences in reliance that might attend a lien creditor's claim on
one versus the other,"5 I do not find Professor Schechter's citations per-
suasive. The illustrations in his footnote 95 of "number of cases" that
show reliance are three. 6 One is from 1965, one from 1931, and the
third is from 1928.17
That real estate law routinely grants priority to unrecorded transfer-
ees over subsequent lien creditors suggests that at least some believe it to
be the fairest outcome. In real property law, it is common for an unre-
corded real estate transfer to be subordinate to the rights of a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, but superior to the rights of a subsequent lien credi-
tor. Presumably, these decisions are based on ad hoc judgments about
lien creditors' reliance and about the fairness of their subordination.
Some courts openly question the injury suffered by the subordination of a
lien creditor in these circumstances. 8 I do not believe that fairness dic-
tates victory for the lien creditor over an unperfected secured creditor.
The potential injury inflicted by a failure to fie is so problematic and
inconsequential that I see no unfairness in asking a lien creditor to suffer
that hypothetical injury.
But treating the conflict as one between an unperfected secured
creditor and a lien creditor misses the point. Because the real competitor
for the unperfected secured creditor is not a lien creditor under state law
but an unsecured creditor whose debtor is in bankruptcy, I think it ulti-
mately unnecessary to argue the morality of an unperfected secured cred-
itor's supremacy over a lien creditor. In summary, the real fairness
argument-that an unsecured general creditor without a lien has a moral
claim to superiority over the rights of an unperfected secured creditor-
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 290.291 (McKinney 1989); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.25(A)
(Anderson 1989).
14. Schechter, supra note 13, at 135 n.95.
15. Because the dollar amounts are likely to be larger and the collateral harder to hide or
to dispose of, one might hypothesize that both secured and unsecured creditors would rely
more heavily on the record when they are dealing with real estate than when they are dealing
with personal property, particularly personal property such as accounts or proceeds that are
short-lived and readily subject to disposition.
16. Schechter, supra note 13, at 135 n.95.
17. Id. (citing Hansen v. G & G Trucking Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 481, 46 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1965); Caltrider v. Caples, 153 A. 445 (Md. 1931); and Iknoian v. Winter, 94 Cal. App. 223,
270 P. 999 (1928)).
18. See Osin v. Johnson, 243 F.2d 653, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Davis v. Johnson, 246 S.E.2d
297, 300-01 (Ga. 1978); Aberdeen Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Empire Manufactured Homes,
Inc., 672 P.2d 409, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
April 1993]1
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was properly rejected by the drafters of section 9-201. It has been resur-
rected only by the alchemy of § 544(a) and section 9-301(1)(b).
IV. WASTE
My basic argument for the superiority of an unperfected security
interest depends not on fairness; it depends on efficiency. My proposal
could eliminate waste in two ways. First, the proposal would render cer-
tain filings by secured creditors unnecessary. Those who seek priority
only over the trustee in bankruptcy and not over other perfected secured
creditors or bona fide purchasers would not need to file. Second, and
more importantly, my proposal would eliminate a significant percentage
of all of the litigation under Article 9, namely, litigation on the question
of whether a particular security interest is perfected.
First consider the cost of filing itself. One must decide where to file,
prepare the documents for filing, present them for filing, pay the fee, and
later check whether one's own filing has been properly made. Undoubt-
edly, some accomplish these through clerical personnel; however, others
engage an expensive lawyer to ensure the filing is properly performed. If
the creditor's only interest is in defeating a trustee in bankruptcy and the
creditor is unconcerned about other competitors, the creditor can save
the entire cost of preparing, filing, searching and the like.19
The greater cost of the current system arises from litigation over
perfection. Here lawyers will be involved on both sides and both (one
directly and the other indirectly) will be paid by the creditors. Because
this litigation arises mostly in bankruptcy, the secured creditor will pay
its lawyer directly, and the unsecured creditors, who are the beneficiaries
of the insolvent bankruptcy estate, will pay the trustee and the trustee's
lawyer indirectly.
With the help of a research assistant and LEXIS, I have tried to find
all of the cases in bankruptcy between the beginning of 1980 and the end
of 1990 in which the issue before the court was the perfection of a secur-
ity interest in personal property. These are cases in which the trustee
used § 544(a) to challenge the perfection of the secured creditor's secur-
ity interest. Although the search revealed 888 reported decisions, less
than half actually involved disputes over the perfection of a security in-
terest. Some dealt with the attachment of a security interest under sec-
tion 9-203, some with security in real property that my proposal will not
19. For an analysis of the deficiencies of the filing system, see Peter A. Alces & Robert M.
Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 99, 105-08
(1991).
[Vol. 26:823
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address, and a few contained no issue at all concerning perfection. Ulti-
mately, I found 343 reported cases in which the perfection issue would
never have been litigated under my proposed regime. In all of them the
trustee in bankruptcy would have been subordinate and the secured cred-
itor would have taken the asset or been treated as a perfected secured
creditor within the Bankruptcy Code.
Finding 343 cases is only the beginning of wisdom. How should one
evaluate the savings in lawyers' and trustees' fees that could have been
enjoyed had none of these issues been litigated? First, how much on av-
erage do these cost? The most direct costs are lawyers' fees, second are
trustees' fees and the time of the court system. In addition, of course,
there is the time and cost of various witnesses and experts, investigation
and the like. The estimation is further complicated by the fact that some
of the cases went all the way to the court of appeals, 20 an expensive prop-
osition, whereas many were settled on motion before the bankruptcy
court.2 1
20. There were 15 cases in the courts of appeals, 27 cases in the district courts, and 301 in
the bankruptcy courts.
21. In the following cases, the parties disputed whether the security interest was perfected
according to Article 9 and the trustee won (unperfected security interest): Compliance
Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging Co.), 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988); Mixon v.
Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987); Sanyo Elec.
Inc. v. Taxel (In re World Fin. Servs. Ctr.), 78 B.R. 239 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); First Nat'l
Bank v. Turley, 705 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1983); Pitrat v. Morris (In re Santa Fe Adobe, Inc.),
34 B.R. 774 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); Sommers v. IBM, 640 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981); Viking
Credit Corp. v. JJ's Home Style Laundry, Inc. (In re JJ's Home Style Laundry, Inc.), 123 B.R.
22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); First E. Bank v. Minichello (In re Minichello), 120 B.R. 17 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1990); Bullock v. Roost (In re Gold Key Properties, Inc.), 119 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1990) (mem.); Karnes v. Salem Nat'l Bank (In re Fullop), 125 B.R. 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1990); O'Rourke v. Ramey Truck & Equip. Co. (In re IDK Logging, Inc.), 116 B.R. 788
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990); National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Fitzgerald v. Westmark Fed.
Credit Union (In re Thompson), No. 89-00045-7, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1504 (Bankr. D. Idaho
June 26, 1990) (mem.); In re Harris, 115 B.R. 376 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Jettmar v. The
New 5510, Inc. (In re The New 5510, Inc.), 114 B.R. 317 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990); Wheels, Inc.
v. Otasco, Inc. (In re Otasco, Inc.), 111 B.R. 976 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); Smith v. Mulnix
(In re Wittenburg), 113 B.R. 66 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Armstrong v. Metropolitan Fed.
Bank (In re Chapman), 113 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990); Drewes v. United States (In re
Bukowski), 109 B.R. 932 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (mem.); Newton v. First Am. Nat'l Bank (In
re Webb), 106 B.R. 517 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); Dodson v. One Valley Bank (In re John-
son), 105 B.R. 352 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1989) (mem.); In re Quality Seafoods, Inc., 104 B.R.
560 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Craft Architectural Metals Corp. v. European Am. Bank (In re
Craft Architectural Metals Corp.), 104 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989); Scott v. McArthur
Say. & Loan Co. (In re Winnett), 102 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Pretzer, 100
B.R. 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989); Advanced Aviation, Inc. v. Vann (In re Advanced Avia-
tion, Inc.), 101 B.R. 310 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota
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Util. Contracting, Inc. (In re Minnesota Util. Contracting, Inc.), 101 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1989); In re Ballard, 100 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1989); Dabney v. Information
Exch., Inc. (In re Information Exch., Inc.), 98 B.R. 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Van Kylen (In re Van Kylen), 98 B.R. 455 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1989); In re Neutgens, No. 86-40520, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2725 (Bankr. D. Mont.
Mar. 13, 1989); Olin Assocs. v. Bright Banc Say. Assoc. (In re Olin Assocs.), 98 B.R. 271
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); Lyn-Dee Dairy Farm, Inc. v. Schafsma (In re Lyn-Dee Dairy Farm,
Inc.), 97 B.R. 95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); Gennet v. Hartman (In re Wilson), 95 B.R. 841
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); Avair, Inc. v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Avair, Inc.), 98 B.R. 261
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988); Walsh v. Shoenthal (In re Trail), No. 88-00819, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS
1967 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1988); Kearney Hotel Partners v. Richardson (In re Kearney
Hotel Partners), 92 B.R. 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); John Oliver Co. v. BayBank Merrimack
Valley (In re John Oliver Co.), 91 B.R. 643 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); In re Howards Appliance
Corp., 91 B.R. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 874 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Waters, 90 B.R.
946 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988); Grant v. Citizens First Bank (In re Eisaman), 90 B.R. 528
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Anderson v. Hercules, Inc. (In re Creel), 118 B.R. 372 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1988); Armstrong v. Rohweder (In re Brower), 104 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988);
Anderson v. Blackman (In re Karisda, Inc.), 90 B.R. 196 (D.S.C. 1988); Carlson v. Seeley (In
re Maxwell), 89 B.R. 46 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (mem.); Inn at Grand Glaize, Ltd. v. Na-
tional Bank (In re Inn at Grand Glaize, Ltd.), 89 B.R. 40 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (mem.);
Radice Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Radice Corp.), 88 B.R. 422 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988);
U.S. Cylinders, Inc. v. Vital Breathing Prods. (In re Vital Breathing Prods.), 98 B.R. 97
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Milcher, 86 B.R. 103 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988); In re Car-
mack, 84 B.R. 625 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 94 B.R. 148 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, No. 88-4157-CV-C-5, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15693 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 1988); Bank
of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84 B.R. 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1988); Hill v. Earthman (In re Hill), 83 B.R. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Waters, 83
B.R. 594 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988); Brown v. Belarus Mach., Inc. (In re Service Lawn &
Power, Inc.), 83 B.R. 515 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Davadick, 82 B.R. 391 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1988); Remes v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Churchwell), 80 B.R. 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1987); Kleinfeld v. Citrus Park Bank (In re Clover Leaf Dairy), 79 B.R. 499
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); Underwood v. Kensington Mortgage & Fin. Co. (In re Tuders), 77
B.R. 904 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Hinson, 77 B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1987);
Sendore, Inc. v. Pongetti (In re Columbus Typewriter Co.), 75 B.R. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1987); First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris (In re Stewart), 74 B.R. 350 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1987); Kingsley v. First Am. Bank (In re Kingsley), 73 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re
Lemon, No. 84-04235-A, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 673 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1987); Dunn v.
Alexander Lumber Co. (In re Kirk), 71 B.R. 510 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Navarro v. IBM, 70 B.R. 94
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Weaver, 69 B.R. 554 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1987); McTevia v.
Adamo (In re Atlantic Mortgage Corp.), 69 B.R. 321 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); Todd v.
Production Credit Ass'n (In re Todd), 70 B.R. 204 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Baron v. Waldo
(In re Waldo), 70 B.R. 16 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Keystone Acceptance Corp. v. Nardulli &
Sons Co. (In re Nardulli & Sons Co.), 66 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Howards
Appliance Corp., 69 B.R. 47 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 91 B.R. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); In
re Madison's Partner Group, 67 B.R. 629 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Central Nat'l Bank v.
Donahue (In re Cordes), 65 B.R. 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Nardulli & Sons Co. (In re Nardulli & Sons Co.), 66 B.R. 871 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); Robin-
son v. Howard Bank (In re Kors, Inc.), 64 B.R. 163 (D. Vt. 1986); Brinkmann v. White Farm
Equip. Co. (In re White Farm Equip. Co.), 63 B.R. 800 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); Andriacchi's,
Inc. v. Pike (In re Pike), 62 B.R. 765 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Production Credit Ass'n v. Lane (In
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re Cattle Complex Corp.), 61 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1986); In re Baquet, 61 B.R. 495
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1986); Wasserman v. Society Nat'1 Bank, 58 B.R. 9.12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1986); In re Coody, 59 B.R. 164 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986); In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (mem.); In re Wallace, 61 B.R. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986) (mem.);
Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (mem.);
In re Doyen, 56 B.R. 632 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986); Flowers v. United States (In re Flowers), 78
B.R. 724 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986); In re Swati, Inc., 54 B.R. 498 (Bankr. N.D. InI. 1985); Wendel
v. Florida Nat'l Bank (In re Shams), 54 B.R. 61 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Towery, 53
B.R. 76 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Twin Valley Seed Co., 53 B.R. 592 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985); Ledford v. Thorp Fin. Servs. (In re Joyce), 52 B.R. 45 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); Kay
Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc. (In re McGovern Auto Spe-
cialty, Inc.), 51 B.R. 511 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. MSC, Inc. (In re MSC,
Inc.), 54 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985) (mem.); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders,
Inc. (In re Universal Builders, Inc.), 53 B.R. 183 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); Robinson v.
Howard Bank (In re Kors, Inc.), 50 B.R. 874 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); Coral Petroleum, Inc. v.
Banque Paribas (In re Coral Petroleum, Inc.), 50 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); Frier v.
Creative Bath Prods. (In re Measure Control Devices, Inc.), 48 B.R. 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); Ferdinand J. Snow Co. v. Waldick Aero-Space Devices, Inc. (In re Waldick Aero-Space
Devices, Inc.), 49 B.R. 192 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); Craig v. Union County Bank (In re Crab-
tree), 48 B.R. 528 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (mer.); In re American Home Furnishings Corp.,
48 B.R. 905 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985); Navarro v. Lucas (In re K & A Servicing, Inc.), 47
B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re DeNauw's Inc., 47 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985);
Hassett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 46 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank (In re I.A. Durbin, Inc.), 46 B.R.
595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Edward Pirsig Farms, Inc. v. John Deere Co. (In re Pirsig Farms,
Inc.), 46 B.R. 237 (D. Minn. 1985); Limerick v. Limerick (In re Answerfone, Inc.), 48 B.R. 24
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); Supnik v. Key Bank (In re Brown), 45 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1985); Shuster v. Doane (In re Shuster), 47 B.R. 920 (D. Minn. 1985), rev'd, 784 F.2d 883 (8th
Cir. 1986); Koch v. United States (In re Mattick), 45 B.R. 615 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Leake
v. Deutz Tractor Corp. (In re Sutphin), 44 B.R. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); Still v. J.L.
Lester & Son (In re Bubba's of Tenn., Inc.), 45 B.R. 82 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 44 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); Donnelly v. Boufsko, Inc. (In re
Boufsko, Inc.), 44 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Group Dev. Corp. v. E.J. Management
Corp. (In re Group Dev. Corp.), 43 B.R. 665 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); Metropolitan Bank v.
Stroh (In re Stroh), 44 B.R. 65 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Becker v. Bank of Barron (In re
Becker), 46 B.R. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984); Howison v. Rockport Nat'l Bank (In re Crow-
ley), 42 B.R. 603 (D. Me. 1984); Armstrong v. United States (In re Galvin), 46 B.R. 12
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); In re Kaneohe Custom Design, Ltd., 41 B.R. 298 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1984); In re Kaufman, 41 B.R. 972 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); RCA Corp. v. Video East, Inc. (In
re Video East, Inc.), 41 B.R. 176 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); United Nat'l Bank v. Corsica Enters.
(In re Corsica Enters.), 40 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984); Williams v. Weems (In re Ken
Gardner Ford Sales), 41 B.R. 105 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); Bailey v. Farris (In re Farris), 40
B.R. 58 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1984); In re Star Safety, Inc. 39 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984);
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Sports Enters. (In re Sports Enters.), 38 B.R. 282 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1984); In re Hammond, 38 B.R. 548 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); Rechnitzer v. Boyd
(In re Executive Growth Invs., Inc.), 40 B.R. 417 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); Chief Freight Lines
Co. v. Strick Fin. Co. (In re Chief Freight Lines Co.), 37 B.R. 436 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1984);
Feldman v. Schreiber (In re Finkle), 38 B.R. 101 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984); Anderson v. South
Carolina Nat'l Bank (In re McWhorter), 37 B.R. 742 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984); USI Capital &
Leasing v. Medical Oxygen Serv. (In re Medical Oxygen Serv.), 36 B.R. 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1984); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hoffer (In re Hoffer), 34 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983); Stainer v. Bank of Tulsa (In re Haning), 35 B.R. 242 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1983); Wood
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Wood), 38 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); Kaye v. Williams (In re
Munzenreider Corp.), 34 B.R. 82 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); Barrington v. Farmers Home Ad-
min., 34 B.R. 55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); Cohen v. Spinelli (In re Simonelli), 33 B.R. 777
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re My Place or Yours, Inc., 34 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In
re Sterling Wood Prods., 34 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Davies Ins. Servs. (In re Davies Ins. Servs.), 33 B.R. 252 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Castle Rock
Ind. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters.), 32 B.R. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1983); Still v. Cal-Maine Foods (In re Mayfield), 31 B.R. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re
Cripps, 31 B.R. 541 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); Harwell v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Sewell), 32
B.R. 116 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Patco, Inc. v. Hammond (In re Hammond), 31 B.R. 517
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Jerome, 31 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); Brent Explora-
tions, Inc. v. Karst Enters. (In re Brent Explorations, Inc.), 31 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983); Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc. (In re Critiques, Inc.), 29 B.R. 941 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1983); Nazar v. Southern (In re Southern), 32 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); Caris Super-
market, Inc. v. Fratello (In re Caris Supermarket, Inc.), 28 B.R. 623 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983);
Paul Arpin Van Lines v. Babb (In re Hughen), 38 B.R. 13 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); Rock
Hill Nat'l Bank v. York Chem. Indus. (In re York Chem. Indus.), 30 B.R. 583 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1983); In re International Home Design, Inc., 28 B.R. 584 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (mem.);
Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Johnson), 28 B.R. 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Satter-
white, 28 B.R. 178 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983); Lighting Showcase, Inc. v. Ile, Inc. (In re Ile,
Inc.), 32 B.R. 71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Reno Courts Ltd. v. ABW Assocs. (In re ABW,
Inc.), 29 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1983); Peoples Bank v. McDonald (In re Maryville Say. &
Loan Corp.), 27 B.R. 701 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Conti (In re
Conti), 27 B.R. 175 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Amsco, Inc., 26 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1982); Edleman v. Grand Valley Nat'l Bank (In re Haines & Baker Excavating, Inc.), 25 B.R.
869 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982); GMAC v. Waligora, 24 B.R. 905 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Bierly v.
Bierly (In re Bierly), 28 B.R. 57 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Jones (In
re Circle Fabrication, Inc.) No. 81-00246-232, slip op. (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 1982);
Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.), 23 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In
re Moriarty, 22 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford
Sales (In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales), 23 B.R. 743 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Mayfield, 22 B.R.
423 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Southwest Nat'1 Bank v. Southworth (In re Southworth), 22
B.R. 376 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); Bell v. Ameritrust Co. (In re Moore), 21 B.R. 898 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982); Underground Flint, Inc. v. Viro, Inc., 80 B.R. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1982); First
Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 21 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982); In re McBee, 20
B.R. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983); In re American
Riggers, Inc., 19 B.R. 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Alsted Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co. (In re Alsted Automotive Warehouse, Inc.), 16 B.R. 926 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); Koenig, Inc. v. Ateco Equip., Inc. (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 17 B.R. 230 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1982); Venn v. Finance Am., 19 B.R. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v.
Turley (In re Turley), 17 B.R. 99 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); Citizens Bank v. Sportswear Shoppe
(In re Sportswear Shoppe), 15 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Young v. Pentagon Fed.
Credit Union (In re Bundy), 15 B.R. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Litton Indus. Credit Corp.
v. Dunn Bros. (In re Dunn Bros.), 16 B.R. 42 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981); Pongetti v. Lackey (In
re Elvis Presley Heights Supermarket, Inc.), 13 B.R. 956 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981) (mem.);
In re Bindl, 13 B.R. 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Kanasky v. Purbeck (In re R. Purbeck
& Assocs.), 12 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); McDaniel v. American Druggists Ins. Co.
(In re National Buy-Rite, Inc.), 11 B.R. 196 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); Hale v. Kontaratos (In
re Kontaratos), 10 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Cash Register Sys., Inc. v. Munsey Corp.
(In re Munsey Corp.), 10 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); Busch v. Washington Communica-
tions Group (In re Washington Communications Group), 10 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981);
In re Decker, 10 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981); Goodman v. Schenck (In re Swafford
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Furniture Co.), 10 B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re L & K Transp. Co., 8 B.R. 921
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re Rahberg Farms, Inc., 8 B.R. 244 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981);
Maremont Mktg., Inc. v. Marshall (In re G.G. Moss Co.), 9 B.R. 47 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981);
Sapir v. Mancuso (In re Kambourelis), 8 B.R. 138 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981); McDonald v.
National Bank (In re Hill), 7 B.R. 433 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980); Strickler v. Thomas (In re
Thomas), 7 B.R. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); Styler v. Local Loan Fin. Servs. (In re Lanctot),
6 B.R. 576 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980); Carter v. Greene County Bank (In re Wilhoit), 6 B.R. 574
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); Retreading Equip., Inc. v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 5 B.R. 596
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Roy A. Dart Ins. Agency (In re
Roy A. Dart Ins. Agency), 5 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Associates Commercial Corp.
v. Trim-Lean Meat Prods., Inc. (In re Trim-Lean Meat Prods., Inc.), 5 B.R. 190 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1980), aff'd, 10 B.R. 333 (D. Del. 1981); Circus Time, Inc. v. Grunman Credit Corp. (In
re Circus Time, Inc.), 5 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (mem.); Goger v. United States (In re
Eady), 4 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
In the following cases, the parties disputed whether the security interest was perfected
according to Article 9 and the trustee lost (security interest perfected): Branderhorst v. Cen-
tral Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Branderhorst), 843 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1988); General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Nardulli & Sons, Inc., 836 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Norwest Bank v. Bergquist
(In re Rolain), 823 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1987); Load-It, Inc. v. VTCC, Inc. (In re Load-It, Inc.),
774 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1985); Gray v. Grant Wholesale Corp., 758 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir.
1985); Armstrong v. State Bank (In re Gelking), 754 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 906 (1985); In re Chaseley's Foods, Inc., 726 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1983); Biane v.
United Cal. Bank (In re Biane), 20 B.R. 659 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp.
v. Nunley, 671 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Circus Time, Inc., 641 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1981);
GMAC v. Rupp, 122 B.R. 436 (D. Utah 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1991); A-1
Credit Corp. v. Big Squaw Mountain Corp. (In re Big Squaw Mountain Corp.), 122 B.R. 831
(Bankr. D. Me. 1990); In re Heritage House Interiors, Inc., 122 B.R. 605 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990); Karnes v. Salem Natl Bank (In re Fullop), 125 B.R. 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd,
133 B.R. 627 (S.D. Ill. 1991); Fokkena v. First Nat'l Bank (In re McLaughlin Farms, Inc.),
120 B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990); C Tek Software, Inc. v. New York State Business
Venture Partnership (In re C Tek Software, Inc.), 117 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (mem.);
In re Aguiar, 116 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990); GMAC v. Roach (In re Roach), 115 B.R.
200 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (mem.); In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 117 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1990) (mem.); NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Fogarty (In re Fogarty), 114 B.R. 788 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1990); Sternco, Inc. v. Associates Leasing (In re Rose Way, Inc.), 113 B.R. 527 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1990); Walker v. Tennessee State Bank (In re Williams), 112 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1990); Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Shawmut Worcester County Bank (In re Ivy
Properties, Inc.), 109 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re National Peregrine, Inc.), No. 89-01991, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2469
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1989), rev'd, 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Pokela v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc. (In re Dakota Country Store Foods, Inc.), 107 B.R. 977 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989);
Frank v. Norbel Credit Union (In re Murray), 109 B.R. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989);
Menkel v. Sun Bank & Trust Co. (In re Freedom Rental & Leasing), 102 B.R. 848
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 B.R. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989);
Kroh Operating Ltd. v. Barnett Bank (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 101 B.R. 114 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1989); In re Halvorson, 102 B.R. 736 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); Wabash Valley Power Ass'n
v. United States (In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n), 114 B.R. 613 (S.D. Ind. 1989);
Merchants Bank v. Reddington/Sunstar Ltd. Partnership (In re Reddington/Sunstar Ltd.
Partnership), 100 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988); In re Ramey, 93 B.R. 136 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1988); Miller v. Salem Energy Supplies & Servs. (In re Salem Energy Supplies & Servs.), 92
B.R. 361 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988); In re Waters, 90 B.R. 946 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988); Schaaf
& Johnson, Inc. v. Crabtree Constr. Co. (In re Crabtree Constr. Co.), 87 B.R. 212 (Bankr.
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S.D. Fla. 1988); Charter First Mortgage, Inc. v. Oregon Bank (In re Charter First Mortgage,
Inc.), No. 683-07420, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2653 (Bankr. D. Or. May 24, 1988); Manufacturers
Acceptance Corp. v. Caribank Corp. (In re Manufacturers Acceptance Corp.), 86 B.R. 729
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Waters, 83 B.R. 594 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988), withdrawn, 90
B.R. 946 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988); Frank v. Second Nat'l Bank (In re Gilbert), 82 B.R. 456
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); Maloney v. Stewart Title & Trust (In re Nichols), 88 B.R. 871
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988); Schmidt v. Farmers Nat'l Bank (In re Schmidt), No. 87-483-R, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15510 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 14, 1987); In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., 79 B.R. 759
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (mem.); In re Atlas Technologies, Inc., 78 B.R. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (mem.);
Provident Hosp. & Training Ass'n v. GMAC Mortgage Co. (In re Provident Hosp. & Training
Ass'n), 79 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1987); Gill v. United States (In re Boogie Enters.), 79
B.R. 4 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (mem.), rev'd, 866 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989); Hatfields & McCoys,
Inc. v. First Tampa Capital Corp., 78 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re Neatex, Inc., 77
B.R. 808 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); Gillian v. Covington County Bank (In re Little), 78 B.R. 610
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1987); In re Domestic Fuel Corp., 70 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Hunter v. McHenry (In re McHenry), 71 B.R. 60 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Steinberg v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Meyer-Midway, Inc.), 65 B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986); Vincent Gaines Implement Co. v. United States (In re Vincent Gaines Implement Co.),
71 B.R. 14 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); Murphy v. Griffel (In re Wegner), 61 B.R. 414 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1986), ree'd, 839 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1988); Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc. v. Farmers
& Merchants Bank (In re Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc.), 59 B.R. 863 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1986); Woodson v. Community Bank & Trust Co. (In re B & S Motor Freight, Inc.), 59 B.R.
259 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Coody, 59 B.R. 164 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986); In re
Farnham, 57 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); Apex Oil Co. v. Tims (In re Armstrong), 56 B.R.
781 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Lipply, 56 B.R. 68 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Pounds, No.
3-84-01156, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1985); Ledford v. Easy Living Furniture (In re Jack-
son), No. 3-84-00195, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 1985); Schilling v. Peoples State Bank (In re
Hazle Farm & Power Equip.), 53 B.R. 30 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Armstrong v. Hustad (In
re Flaten), 50 B.R. 186 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); FDIC v. Fidelity Elecs., Ltd. (In re Fidelity
EIecs., Ltd.), 52 B.R. 475 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); F.R. of N.D., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
F.R. of N.D., Inc.), 54 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Herrell v. Bank of Elroy (In re Mitch-
ell Bros. Constr., Inc.), 52 B.R. 92 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); Greeman Motor, Inc. v. United
N.M. Bank [sic] (In re Greeman Motors, Inc.), 48 B.R. 611 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); Robinson
v. United States SBA (In re Catamount Dyers, Inc.), 50 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); First
State Bank v. Deeb (In re Deeb), 47 B.R. 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Ridley, 50 B.R.
51 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Edwards Equip. Co., 46 B.R. 689 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1985); Pearson v. Saina Coffee House, Inc. (In re Beacon Realty Inv. Co.), 44 B.R. 875
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984), rev'd, 61 B.R. 538 (D. Kan. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 1531 (10th Cir.
1987); Richmond Fixture & Equip. Co. v. Hyman (In re Southern Properties, Inc.), 44 B.R.
838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); Tinsley & Groom v. West Ky. Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Tinsley
& Groom), 49 B.R. 85 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); Minot Area Dev. Corp. v. Armstrong (In re
Trestle Valley Recreation Area, Inc.), 45 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); Martin v. Landers
(In re Butcher), 43 B.R. 513 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Air Vermont, Inc., 40 B.R. 323
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); McLemore v. Liberty State Bank (In re Johnson), 39 B.R. 478 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Granny Frannies, Inc., 39 B.R. 377 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984); Schneider
v. Ray (In re Roberts), 38 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); In re P.C.A. Landgrading &
Design Contractors, Inc., 37 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); Pendleton v. Dealer Ware-
house, Inc. (In re Pendleton), 40 B.R. 306 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); United States v. McMan-
nis (In re McMannis), 39 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); Gillund v. Minot Builders Supply
Ass'n (In re Lebus-Albrecht Lumber Co.), 38 B.R. 58 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); Wood v. Pills-
bury Co. (In re Wood), 38 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Ramco Well Serv., Inc. (In re Ramco Well Serv., Inc.), 32 B.R. 525 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983);
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McDonald v. Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re McGetrick), 31 B.R. 294 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1983); In re Burgess, 30 B.R. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); United States v. Freeland
(In re Chaseley's Foods, Inc.), 30 B.R. 452 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Mottaz v. Dixon (In re Dixon),
29 B.R. 304 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1983); Coats State Bank v. Grey (In re Grey), 29 B.R. 286
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); Yeager Trucking v. Circle Leasing Corp. (In re Yeager Trucking), 29
B.R. 131 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Skyland, Inc., 28 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983),
aff'd sub nom. In re National Welding, 61 B.R. 314 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Robinson v. Hyatt (In
re Hyatt), 26 B.R. 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd. v. Biscayne Bank
(In re Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd.), 24 B.R. 57 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); H. Meyer Dairy Co. v.
Midwestern Food Stores, Inc. (In re Midwestern Food Stores, Inc.), 21 B.R. 944 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); In re Tele/Resources, Inc., 21 B.R. 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Springfield
Casket Co., 21 B.R. 223 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Willamette Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lovelady
(In re Lovelady), 21 B.R. 182 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); Seidle v. Tashman (In re Jam Fine Furni-
ture, Inc.), 19 B.R. 578 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Roemelmeyer v. Capital Bank (In re L.M.S.
Assocs.), 18 B.R. 425 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); GMAC v. Teefy Pontiac Co. (In re Teefy
Pontiac Co.), 16 B.R. 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Dugas (In re
Stofko), 17 B.R. 115 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Utah Agricorp, Inc. v. Twelves, Civ. No. C 81-
0653J, slip op. (D. Utah Nov. 23, 1981); In re Rex Printing, Inc., 14 B.R. 403 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1981); In re Bindl, 13 B.R. 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Green v. D.D. Joseph Trading
Co. (In re KLK Furs, Inc.), 21 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Jahn v. North Am. Van Lines
(In re Trivett), 12 B.R. 373 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley,
11 B.R. 528 (W.D. Va. 1981); Dodson v. Wessex Mining Corp. (In re Boden Mining Corp.),
11 B.R. 562 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981); Data Gen. Corp. v. Still (In re Ault), 6 B.R. 58 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1980).
In the following cases, the parties disputed whether the creditor possessed an unperfected
security interest or an interest such as a lessor's that would be superior to the trustee's interest
without filing. The trustee won (unperfected secured interest): Pacific Express, Inc. v.
Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1986);
Towne Realty, Inc. v. A-i Hydro Mechanics Corp. (In re A-1 Hydro Mechanics Corp.), No.
87-00881, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12215 (D. Haw. Sept. 13, 1989); Woodson v. Ford Motor
Credit Co. (In re Thompson), 101 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989), rev'd, 114 B.R. 278
(N.D. Okla. 1990); Communications Co. of Am. v. Mitel, Inc. (In re Communications Co. of
Am.), 84 B.R. 822 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Woodson v. GMAC (In re Harvey), 80 B.R. 533
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1987); Brinkmann v. White Farm Equip. Co. (In re White Farm Equip.
Co.), No. 86-7808, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13892 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1987); Nynex Bisc v. Beker
Indus. (In re Beker Indus.), 69 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Woodson v. Tom Bell Leas-
ing (In re Breece), 58 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); Horizon Processing Co. v. Charter
Int'l Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 49 B.R. 513 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Catamount
Dyers, Inc., 43 B.R. 564 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); In re Hillebrand Metal Works, Inc., 38 B.R.
956 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); Continental Fire Trucks, Inc. v. John Grappone, Inc. (In re Con-
tinental Fire Trucks, Inc.), 33 B.R. 713 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); Agritrade Corp. v. General
Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee Corp.), 32 B.R. 23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); W.N.
Provenzano, Inc. v. Monahan & Co. (In re Monahan & Co.), 29 B.R. 579 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1983); Eastern Leasing Corp. v. Pye (In re Pye), 13 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Livesey
Enters. v. Smith Management, Inc. (In re Smith Management, Inc.), 8 B.R. 346 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1980).
In the following cases, the trustee lost (lease or absolute title retained by creditor): Wall
Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Wright (In re Wall Tire Distribs., Inc.), 116 B.R. 867 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1990); General Microcomputer, Inc. v. Crow-Williams #11 (In re General Microcomputer,
Inc.), 118 B.R. 96 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); Woodson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Cole),
100 B.R. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989), aff'd, 114 B.R. 278 (N.D. Okla. 1990); Novack v.
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But there are still more uncertainties. How many reported decisions
were not captured by the research? Worst of all, how many decisions are
unreported? Should one assume that for every mouse seen, forty go un-
detected? Or is the ratio only one for one or five for one? I have no way
of knowing, but surely not all of the opinions were reported, and I sus-
pect that my reported opinions are a small minority of the total. In my
judgment, society's total expenditure on these cases-all saved under my
proposal-could not be less than millions per year, and it might be as
high as tens of millions.22
Clearly the elimination of many filings and much litigation about
the legal effect of such filings will produce a large efficiency dividend.
Business Credit Leasing, Inc. (In re Novack), 88 B.R. 353 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988); In re
Purity Ice Cream Co., 90 B.R. 183 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988); Bank of N.Y. v. Olympia & York
Fla. Equity Corp. (In re Holywell Corp.), 51 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); United States v.
Economy Cab & Tool Co. (In re Economy Cab & Tool Co.), 47 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985); Sight & Sound, Inc. v. Wright, 36 B.R. 885 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Ameri-
can Pouch Foods, Inc. (In re American Pouch Foods, Inc.), 30 B.R. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1983),
aff'd, 769 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Coode v. M & J Fin.
Corp. (In re Boling), 13 B.R. 39 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Drabkin v. Continental Ill. Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 9 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981).
22. One could make an accurate and quite reliable estimate of the costs of litigating perfec-
tion, but beyond my search of the reported cases, I have not attempted to do that. My re-
search is basically bar stool research in which one questions a bankruptcy judge or bankruptcy
lawyer on the next stool about his or her estimate of the cost in lawyers' fees of a perfection
dispute in the bankruptcy court. My bar stool research has turned up such widely varying
figures that I should be embarrassed to report them. One of my respondents who routinely
represents trustees in these kinds of disputes says that in a complete, straightforward case,
where there was no evidence to be presented other than the financing statement and no investi-
gation to be done other than to procure the financing statement his fee would be no more than
$750 to $1000. He was quick to point out that in another case last year his firm had charged
$50,000 in a long suit with a secured creditor over its perfection. That respondent estimated
that there are 100 unreported cases for every reported case. A second bankruptcy lawyer from
the other end of the country estimated that the normal fee would be between $5000 and
$10,000 and that the ratio of unreported to reported cases would be 20 to 1. My third respon-
dent, a big city lawyer from Chicago, estimated the secured creditor's lawyer's fee in most of
the cases worth arguing is $10,000 and up and believes that the ratio of unreported to reported
decisions might be even higher than 100 to 1. My bankruptcy experts also disagreed on the
question whether the number of perfection disputes is diminishing, rising or staying about the
same.
If one starts with my 343 cases and assumes there are 100 unreported cases for every
reported case, one concludes there are 34,300 cases in my eleven-year sample. Then if one
assumes that the average cost of those cases including lawyers' fees for both sides, the time of
the judge and the court apparatus and the cost of witnesses, is $10,000 per case, the total cost
of these priority disputes over the eleven-year term would be nearly $350 million. That comes
to an annual cost of more than $30 million, a number to be respected. If, on the other hand,
one assumes that the ratio of unreported to reported is only 20 to I and that the cost per case is
only $2000, then the total cost over the eleven-year period would be approximately $14 mil-
lion, and annual cost would still be more than $1 million. I tend to believe that the higher
number is closer than the lower one, but if pressed, I would quickly retreat into uncertainty.
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The money that would otherwise be spent in filing, checking files and
litigating over such filings will be available to the players in the credit
market-secured and unsecured creditors and debtors. But the removal
of the protection that is now afforded unsecured creditors in bankruptcy
might itself stimulate wasteful behavior by those unsecured creditors in
their effort to maintain their current position. One can only guess at the
probability of such behavior and at its costs, but if its costs outweigh the
benefits of the efficiencies to be gained, then my proposal should be re-
jected on efficiency grounds alone.
What are these potential inefficiencies? How likely are they to oc-
cur? And what is their cost? If general creditors act in reliance upon the
state of the record (and in ignorance of their subordination under section
9-201 or in the confidence of their superiority over unperfected interests
because of § 544(a) and section 9-301 in case of bankruptcy), it is con-
ceivable that a change in the law will cause those creditors to take other
action in order to return themselves to satisfactory protection. In re-
sponse to my proposal, they could charge higher prices, they could take
and perfect security themselves or they might even choose not to sell on
credit. Neither common sense, anything in the data on bankruptcy, nor
any of the anecdotal evidence I know about creditor behavior would sup-
port such a prediction.
Put yourself in the shoes of a perspicacious unsecured creditor.
Under what circumstances would it make sense for you to change your
current behavior because of the adoption of a proposal that I have made?
First, you will be aware that outside of bankruptcy your claim is already
subordinated to claims of unperfected secured creditors under section 9-
201. That is to say, my proposal makes no change in the unsecured cred-
itor's status, except in the case in which the creditor procures the judicial
lien itself or in which the debtor is forced into bankruptcy and the trustee
asserts a judicial lien on the unsecured creditor's behalf. In order to jus-
tify any change in your behavior because of the abolition of section 9-
301(1)(b), you must have assumed in the current regime that you might
be getting a lien or that some set of its debtors are likely to file for bank-
ruptcy. To reiterate, my proposal does not change the relative priority of
an unperfected security interest versus an unsecured creditor who has no
judicial lien if the debtor is not in bankruptcy. To stir yourself in re-
sponse to section 9-301(l)(b)'s repeal means that currently you must
place some significant value on the potential right to be a lien creditor or
recognize that some significant part of your debtors will find their way
into bankruptcy and that your reward in bankruptcy will be diminished
because of my proposal.
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Because the average unsecured creditor's return is already so low as
to approach insignificance in bankruptcy, it seems implausible that even
a large reduction of that tiny return would justify a creditor's change in
behavior. In a typical Chapter 11 case the unsecured creditor gets some-
thing like fifteen cents on the dollar (and perhaps a promise of future
payments with an uncertain value); in the average Chapter 7 case the
unsecured creditor gets something like four cents on the dollar.23 Even if
they were to lose that entire amount, it would be wasteful to take even
moderately expensive steps to protect their claims. I predict, therefore,
that inefficiencies caused by my proposal (in the form of wasteful un-
secured creditor protective actions) would be de minimus.
If the efficiency gains from the reduction in filing and the elimina-
tion of litigation are as large as they might be, it is plausible that the
unsecured creditors' share of those gains would exceed any loss that the
unsecured creditors would suffer in bankruptcy because of their subordi-
nation in the new regime to unperfected secured creditors. Undoubtedly,
the secured creditors would hope to pocket any savings enjoyed because
of the absence of litigation over perfection and the reduction of filing
costs. But in a competitive market, it is unlikely that all of the efficiency
gains would rest in their pockets.
If the creditors' costs decline in a competitive market, one would
expect the charges for credit to decline and thus for the debtor to enjoy
some of the gains from the efficiency. Part of the debtor's gain could be
passed in turn to the unsecured creditors in the form of greater payments
prior to bankruptcy or in the form of greater payments in bankruptcy
(because the debtor would theoretically be more solvent under the new
regime having shared in the benefits of the new efficiency than under the
current, less efficient regime). Because the unsecured creditors' average
distributions in bankruptcy are already so low, it would take only a small
23. See Michelle J. White, Survey Evidence on Business Bankruptcy (Jan. 11, 1993) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Con-
trol-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247
(pts. I & 2) (1983)); see also Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the
Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bank-
ruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285
(1990).
Professor White used her own data and some data from other studies to compute her
average values. In small Chapter 11 bankruptcies she found an average payoff to unsecured
creditors of 14% to 16% at the time of reorganization plan adoption, plus promises to pay
18% to 22% more in future installments. White, supra. The latter figures are not discounted
to account for delay in payment, or promises unfulfilled. For large Chapter 11 bankruptcies,
the studies found an average payoff ranging from 49% to 69%. White, supra.
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added dividend to make up any loss suffered to the secured creditors
because of section 9-301(l)(b)'s repeal.
In summary, it is plausible that the efficiencies gained from eliminat-
mng some filings and much expensive litigation would be more than
enough to cover any wealth transfer from the unsecured creditors to the
secured creditors that might also occur as an incidental result of the re-
peal of section 9-301(1)(b). The real losers from my proposal are trust-
ees, lawyers for the trustee and lawyers for the secured creditors who
currently reap a fee from litigating over the question of perfection. If the
remainder of my hypothesis is true, that expenditure is social waste.
V. FEDERAL LAW
In closing, I address an argument against my proposal that is com-
pletely unrelated to fairness or efficiency. Some maintain that there is no
point in changing section 9-301(1)(b) because the Congress-which
clearly has the power to do so-will simply amend § 544(a) to grant the
trustee priority over unfiled security interests. There are several re-
sponses to that counsel of despair.
First, the same reasons that cause the states to repeal section 9-
301(l)(b) should keep the Congress from amending § 544(a). If states
believe it is fair that the trustee in bankruptcy should be subordinated to
a secured creditor who has not filed a financing statement, why should
the Congress differ? If it is waste for the trustee in bankruptcy to chal-
lenge inartfully perfected security interests, it is waste for the citizens of
the United States, not just waste for the residents of a particular state. If
my argument is right, it should persuade the Congress as well as the
states.
A second response to the prophets of despair arises from recent his-
tory in the Congress. In the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act and the subsequent amendments to that Act, the Congress has paid
respect to the various forms of automatic perfection (i.e., perfection with-
out fiing) that have always been a part of section 9-302 of the UCC.
Even though a variety of secured creditors are given perfection and prior-
ity over lien creditors without any public action, the Congress has never
overturned this rule by expanding the powers of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. If, therefore, I am right in the arguments I make here, I see no,
reason why they should not persuade the Congress as well as the states.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In my view, both the fairness and the efficiency arguments favor the
change that I propose. Nowhere has God said that it is more fair for an
unperfected secured creditor to be subordinate to a lien creditor than vice
versa. In bankruptcy, where the real beneficiaries are unsecured credi-
tors without liens, fairness-as expressed by the current section 9-201-
tips my way. And the efficiency gains seem clear. The repeal of section
9-301(l)(b) might induce some inefficient behavior by unsecured credi-
tors. But that is only speculation, and the modest return from any such
behavior makes it improbable that any clear thinking creditor would pur-
sue such wasteful behavior. If the truth were known, the expenditures
that I would avoid may come close to a deadweight loss. They are ex-
penditures that cost much but benefit creditors and debtors little.
